World War II/Atomic bomb

On the 16th of July 1945, the first-ever nuclear bomb was detonated in New Mexico—launching humanity into the Atomic Age. Three weeks after, two atomic bombs would be dropped on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and Japan would offer a conditional surrender on the 10th of August. The only condition was that their emperor would stay as head of state.

Harry Truman ordered an immediate halt to the atomic attacks, of which multiple more were planned, following Japan’s peace negotiations. On August 12, they accepted the offer, provided that the emperor was strictly a ceremonial title. Japan was unsure as to whether to accept on these terms. The US, growing increasingly impatient, resumed air strikes against Japan on the 13th of August. Later that day, Japan would surrender on Allied terms, with Emperor Hirohito saying that “I have concluded that continuing the war can only mean destruction for the nation and a prolongation of bloodshed and cruelty in the world. I cannot bear to see my innocent people suffer any longer!"

The impact of the atomic bombs on the war cannot be understated. While it did not specifically affect Australia more than any other nation, it had widespread ramifications for the western world’s relationships to the Soviet Union, and sped up the development of the Cold War, which would last four decades and change America’s political spectrum. Similarly, the historiography of the atomic bombs would affect cultural perceptions of both the United States and the western world at large (given revisionism’s harsh criticisms of the Allies’ actions). As a direct result of the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan offered an unconditional surrender, officially ending World War II.

Historiography
The dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki remains one of the most controversial decisions in US foreign policy today. Debate has raged among historians on the morality of the atomic bombs– in particular, if it was entirely necessary for the Allies to bomb Japan to secure a victory. Germany had already surrendered in May of 1945, Italy surrendered in 1943; only Japan was left, and defeat was clearly imminent. As a result, three schools of thought have been created surrounding the atomic bombs: Orthodox/traditionalists, revisionists and ‘consensus’ historians.

Orthodox historians agree with the stance posited by President Truman—the atomic bomb was necessary for the ending of the war. Revisionists are critical of this, instead seeing the dropping of the bombs as a tactical anti-Soviet move that sped up the development of the Cold War. Much of the revisionist stance is based around Gar Alperovitz’s 1965 concept of ‘atomic diplomacy’. Meanwhile, ‘consensus’ historians seek to find a middle ground between the two interpretations, arguing that while the Truman administration would have been well-aware of less destructive methods to end the war, but reject the notion of ‘atomic diplomacy’.

Orthodox perspectives
Traditionalist views on the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki agree with the story put forward by President Harry Truman and other influential members of his cabinet— dropping the bombs was not only the correct choice but was fundamentally necessary to end the war. Furthermore, without the atomic bombs, traditionalists argue that more lives would have been lost—an invasion of Japan would have been necessary to secure an Allied victory, leading to the loss of hundreds of thousands, if not millions of lives. Central to the Orthodox historian’s point is the rejection of ‘atomic diplomacy’—traditionalists reject the view that the atomic bombs were dropped by the United States to assert control over the Soviet Union or maintain control in their relationships with Asia. Orthodox historian Michael D Gordin ultimately summarises the orthodox view by writing that “it is no less obvious that the military (ending the war quickly) drove the diplomatic (not pressuring the Soviet Union until the war is over)”.

Revisionist perspectives
The revisionist approach to the atomic bombs is far more critical of Truman’s decision and is closely linked to the revisionist view of the Cold War. It operates on a few central tenets:


 * 1) Japan had already been defeated by the time the bombs were dropped; all of its’ allies had surrendered by May of 1945. Historian Kenneth B Pyle writes “Why drop the bomb if Japan was on the verge of surrender?”
 * 2) Using the atomic bomb was not Truman’s only choice for ending the war and was largely unnecessary; see point 3.
 * 3) The casualty figures of an invasion of Japan that would have occurred if the bombs were not dropped were largely overstated by the Truman administration.
 * 4) The United States bombed Japan to threaten the USSR and limit the Soviets’ influence in Asia, hopefully stopping the spread of Communism.

Of these, point 4 is most central to revisionism and was named ‘atomic diplomacy’ by historian Gar Alperovitz in 1965. Revisionists saw the bombing of Japan as part of a larger pattern; Truman’s refusal to cooperate with the USSR. Truman’s primary motivation for bombing Hiroshima and Nagasaki was to prevent the Soviets from exerting influence over the region and spreading Communism. Furthermore, Eisenhower, MacArthur and Admiral Leahy (Truman’s chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) all opposed the bomb’s use, with Leahy writing that “the use of this barbarous weapon at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan [...] My own feeling is that in being the first to use it, we had adopted an ethical standard common to the barbarians of the Dark Ages.”