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Evidence in International Relations
International Relations as a discipline is, at least in its core, a highly theoretical field, while evidence is defined by the Oxford Dictionary as "information indicating whether a belief or proposition is true or valid", indicating a certain necessity for a degree of empirical evidence or real-world proof. It is therefore difficult to define what, in terms of IR, would serve as sufficient evidence to a theory, especially because many, such as realism and liberalism, are so directly opposed to each other.

For example, when considering Liberal Pacifism, specifically the idea that libertarian democracies do not, statistically, go to war with each other, many will often cite the study carried out by R. J. Rummel in 1983, which showed that free states are a lot less likely to be involved in conflict than non-free states. Specifically, free states scored 24%, partly free (such as for example Sweden) scored 26%, while non-free states scored a surprising 61%. While this does seem to supply quantitative evidence to support Schumpeter's liberal pacifism, there are many criticisms of both the application of the study and the study itself.

To begin with the study itself, the most obvious criticism is the inherent restrictions imposed on the data; primarily, the time frame and the criteria which would signify a conflict, which lead to the exclusion of such conflict as the Cold War, as well as the Angola intervention and the U.S. war in Nicaragua. Furthermore, when examining the usefulness of the 'evidence' itself, even if the basic premise is accepted, there remains the question the suitability of the study to serve as a justification the theory. Such as in the case of Liberal Pacifism, it is unclear whether liberal states do not engage in conflict due to the monadic explanation, which is that states that democracies are peaceful by nature, or the didactic version, which points out that democracies are only peaceful with regard to each other, but not towards other, non liberal states.

Evidence in international relations can also be derived from interpretation, such as looking at past examples of state organisation, such is used to demonstrate the effectiveness of Liberal Imperialism, where Machiavelli uses states such as Polybius's Rome or Thucydides Athens, both of which were imperial republics, as evidence and as models.

Even within international relations, however, there is a discrepancy between paradigms with regard to necessary evidence. Jack Levy identifies rational choice, democratic peace and power balance as such successful IR paradigms. Fur

While some say there is a tendency to prioritise qualitative to quantitative data when approaching IR,, interpretivism can also serve as a valid epistemological tool.

Furthermore, different disciplines require a different amount or type of of evidence in order to be sufficient and justified. For example, scientific theory primarily focuses on empirical evidence, which is deduced usually by the application of the scientific method, a rigid methodology which puts the 'evidence' through a routine procedure, which is implemented partially to establish the validity of the information. In subject areas such as theoretical physics, the price of insufficient evidence is merely an incorrect hypothesis, while mechanical engineering, for example, requires much more certain evidence in order to justify action, because of its real world application to infrastructure. There is a similar range in the humanities, with areas like philosophy, which carry a relatively vague requirements for evidence, in opposition to those which aid and lead to policy making, such as, on occasion, international relations.

Evidence gathering methodologies, therefore, have a huge impact on shaping the very discipline where the evidence will be applied. An approach to evidence highly criticised by R. Lebow and M. Lichbach is that which is prescribed "Designing Social Enquiry" by King, Keohane and Verba, which is currently a widely read text in the study of IR in the United States. The main issues regarding the text are cited to be the inaccurate characterisation of science as a discipline, as well as undermining the value of qualitative research.

Furthermore, different disciplines require a different amount or type of of evidence in order to be sufficient and justified. For example, scientific theory primarily focuses on empirical evidence, which is deduced usually by the application of the scientific method, a rigid methodology which puts the 'evidence' through a routine procedure, which is implemented partially to establish the validity of the information. In subject areas such as theoretical physics, the price of insufficient evidence is merely an incorrect hypothesis, while mechanical engineering, for example, requires much more certain evidence in order to justify action, because of its real world application to infrastructure. There is a similar range in the humanities, with areas like philosophy, which carry a relatively vague requirements for evidence, in opposition to those which aid and lead to policy making, such as, on occasion, international relations.

It is interesting to see exactly how differently the many disciplines view evidence, even when looking at the same question. A real life example would be choosing between the effectiveness of either conditional and unconditional cash transfers, where economists and social scientists not only disagree on what would be the most effective solution to poverty, but disagree on the very criteria by which said effectiveness will be judged.