Transportation Planning Casebook/Melbourne Metro and Suburban Rail Loop

Metro Tunnel
The Metro Tunnel is a 9km long railway tunnel currently under construction under the Melbourne CBD. It will be fitted with five new train stations, each equipped with platform screen doors and advanced signaling.

The Metro Tunnel is being built to bypass the congested city loop around the Melbourne CBD. When Melbourne’s railway network was being developed, there were two main stations in the Melbourne CBD. Flinders Street station was the terminus for trains coming into the CBD from the east, and Spencer Street station (now called Southern Cross) was the terminus for trains coming into the CBD from the west. In 1891, these two stations were linked up by the two-track Flinders Street Viaduct.

This enabled trains to through-run from the east of the CBD to the west. Having Melbourne’s entire railway network linked only by a two-track viaduct quickly led to congestion on the network. To address these capacity concerns, the Flinders Street Viaduct was widened twice more from two tracks to four, and then from four tracks to six. Additionally, the City Loop was constructed to form a ring around the CBD. The City Loop is a set of four separate railway tunnels opened progressively between 1981 and 1985. This enabled trains coming into the CBD to loop around it and then return, which was useful because more trains were coming into the CBD from the east than from the west. The City Loop also saw the addition of Flagstaff, Melbourne Central (formerly Museum), and Parliament stations.

Since the City Loop opened, congestion on the network in the Melbourne CBD has got worse. The City Loop is reaching capacity, which limits the frequency of services on all the lines it serves. This is what the Metro Tunnel hopes to solve. The metro tunnel will provide a new route through the Melbourne CBD, enabling trains to run between the east and west of Melbourne without clogging up the City Loop. The current proposal is to run the Sunbury, Cranbourne, and Packenham (soon to be East Packenham) lines through the Metro Tunnel, creating a direct service between the east and west of Melbourne.

The Metro Tunnel will also include five new stations. ANZAC Station will be located near the shrine of rememberance. Town Hall station will be located at the south end of the Melbourne CBD and will be linked up with the existing Flinders Street station. State Library station will be located on the north side of the Melbourne CBD and will link up with the existing Melbourne Central station. Parkville station will be located to the north of north of the Melbourne CBD and will primarily serve the University of Melbourne. Finally, Arden station will be located west of Parkville station and will serve a new urban renewal project. The Metro Tunnel passes very close to South Yarra station but does not have an interchange there. This has been criticized as a missed opportunity to connect the Metro Tunnel to the trams on the road above.

As of April 2024, the Metro tunnel is predicted to open in late 2024 and the final cost is predicted to be over $12B.

Suburban Rail Loop
The Suburban Rail Loop (SRL) is a 90km rail line currently under construction in the suburbs of Melbourne. It will be Melbourne’s first circumferential line and will provide a loop around Melbourne that does not go through the CBD.

Melbourne has a large train network extending nearly 450km and consisting of over 200 stations. However, Melbourne’s train network is entirely radial. This means that all of Melbourne’s train lines radiate out from the CBD. While this makes commuting from the suburbs to the CBD extremely easy, it makes travelling between suburbs by train extremely hard. For passengers who want to travel from one suburb to another on a different line, they would need to take a train into the CBD and change trains. If the destination is on the same side of the CBD as the origin, then this would mean a huge detour. A transfer would still be necessary even if the stop in question is on the other side of the city, as only the Werribee, Williamstown, and Frankston lines run from one side of the CBD to the other. There are tram routes between suburbs, but they mostly serve Melbourne’s inner suburbs. This means that the only practical public transport option for travel between the outer and middle suburbs is buses. However, many of these inter-suburban bus routes have frequencies as bad as every 40 minutes, and some only operate on selected days of the week.

The SRL aims to fix this by providing a loop through the suburbs from the east of the city to the west. This will make inter-suburban travel far easier and link to new areas previously unserved by rail. The project is split into four phases. SRL East is currently under construction and will link Cheltenham to Box Hill via the existing Clayton and Glen Waverley stations and provide new stations at Monash and Burwood. The next phase is SRL North which will link Box Hill to Melbourne Airport via the existing Heidelberg, Reservoir, Fawker, and Broadmeadows stations. New stations will be built at Doncaster and Bundoora. The third phase is SRL Airport which aims to connect Melbourne Airport to the existing station at Sunshine via a new station at Keilor East. The final stage is SRL West which will connect Sunshine to Werribee. This stage is still in planning, and it is unclear where any new stations will be located.

The SRL has come under fire for its ballooning price tag. The most recent cost blowout has put the cost of the SRL at $216 Billion. This includes construction, and 50 years of operation. The project has also come under scrutiny due to the secretive nature of its development, the timing of its announcement (in the leadup to the 2018 Victorian Election), and the questionable business case. The Victorian Liberal Party has pledged to scrap the SRL if elected, citing the enormous cost. Given that the SRL will take many decades to construct and plans for SRL West are still in their early stages, the future of the project looks uncertain.

As of April 2024, SRL east is currently predicted to open in 2035. The current cost estimate stands at $32.8B and this is estimate is predicted to increase over time.

Poor Planning
The Metro Tunnel's electromagnetic field interference towards nearby medical facilities like the Victorian Comprehensive Cancer Centre and Royal Melbourne Hospital has raised concerns. When experts first became concerned about electromagnetic interference in 2016, data was gathered to establish exact interference levels. If these levels raise additional concerns, the state government might have to spend millions on shielding or reducing train electrical current in certain tunnel sections.

Given the tunnel's projected 2025 opening and the predicted increase in testing diligence, mitigating long-term methods are currently being discussed. MRIs have been moved to lessen the effects, and more hospital wings or floors have been built to protect equipment. Furthermore, urgent imaging requirements will be given priority to maintain the course of treatment. Still, there are issues, especially with the University of Melbourne's and Parkville Biomedical Precinct's sensitive scientific equipment.

The project's environmental consequences statement also mentions various environmental dangers, like asbestos in the ground, vapours in station boxes, and contaminated groundwater. The Melbourne Metro Rail Authority intends to work with contractors to decide how to dispose of and stockpile materials. Critics point to the 2016 decision to designate Domain as the spoil stockpiling site without providing precise location details to support their claims that waiting until after the building contract is granted is misleading or indicative of poor planning. Opposition asserts that proper project planning requires finalising important elements.

Cost Overruns
The Metro Tunnel project in Melbourne, Australia, has faced some challenges, including significant cost overruns and delays. Despite the government's cost-saving measures, such as removing 27 km of high-capacity signalling and limiting other network improvements, the tunnel and station construction phase has exceeded its budget by $364 million. The project's total estimated cost has also risen from the original 2017 budget of $10.7 billion to $12.58 billion, an increase of $1.88 billion.

Nontransparent Planning Process
The development of the Suburban Rail Loop project followed an unconventional and confidential process. It did not involve the state's two most senior transport bureaucrats and bypassed typical channels of involvement from senior planning and transportation officials. Instead, the initiative was led by a group of PwC consultants, and funds were transferred from the Department of Premier and Cabinet to Development Victoria without the latter organisation's board being informed. Oversight of the project was assigned to a deputy secretary within the Department of Premier and Cabinet. Additionally, the most senior transport infrastructure bureaucrat requested a non-disclosure agreement to participate. These circumstances raise questions about government procedures and project development transparency.

An investigation highlights potential consequences stemming from the project's secretive nature and exclusion of public sector professionals. Concerns about the lack of collaboration and information exchange across portfolios and with external experts have been raised, which are deemed essential for comprehensive testing and risk assessment. This casts doubt on the reliability of the project's risk evaluation and management of potential hazards.

The investigation, prompted by revelations of how the Victorian government bypassed its usual bureaucratic processes to initiate the largest and most expensive infrastructure project in any Australian state, underscores concern about transparency and adherence to appropriate procedures in the development of the Suburban Rail Loop project. These findings prompt further scrutiny of the project's transparency and procedural integrity.

Planning Document Background
As the Suburban Rail Loop project was started without any forethought or discussion, it has come under fire for what is seen as a lack of strategic vision. To effectively direct government responses to urban expansion, experts stress the significance of a thorough metropolitan planning strategy, especially in light of the significant financial commitment necessary.

Additionally, there are concerns regarding alignment with planned transportation networks due to the lack of orbital rail in the 2017 document "Plan Melbourne: 2017 – 2050," which the Premier claims inspired the Suburban Rail Loop. The exclusion of an orbital rail project from Infrastructure Victoria's 30-year infrastructure vision, which was unveiled in December 2016, highlights this disparity even more. These differences indicate a mismatch between the proposed Suburban Rail Loop and current planning frameworks.

Although the government intends to expand neighbourhoods and establish new activity hubs based on the Melbourne Plan, other experts contend that other, more affordable measures, including a medium train and bus system, would be adequate. But it's important to understand that the Suburban Rail Loop is more than just transportation infrastructure—it's a foundation for city-shaping projects.

In conclusion, the Suburban Rail Loop project broke away from earlier strategy papers and arose in the middle of subpar metropolitan planning. This calls into question the project's conformance to more general goals of urban development as well as the coordination of government initiatives.

Technical Design Aspect
In relation to station spacing and accessibility, passengers may have to walk a considerable distance between lines at stations where Melbourne's current rail network intersects, and preliminary plans suggest that important stops throughout the first stage of the loop may be far from the main hubs they are intended to service. This comment has appeared as the small number of proposed stations—just 15 throughout the whole loop, with an average distance of six km between them—is cause for alarm. The arrangement casts questions on the system's usability and accessibility for those who live close to the route, as large populations may be left underserved by the stations that are close by. For example, in the first stage, the stations between Cheltenham and Clayton are eight km apart, meaning that almost 200,000 people live between these sites with limited access to stations. Although the Suburban Rail Loop is intended to link major centres, its ability to benefit the surrounding community is still up for question.

Feasibility & Business Case
The Victorian Auditor-General criticised the Suburban Rail Loop's business case, pointing out that it did not satisfy normal investment standards, evaluate alternatives sufficiently, or calculate benefits appropriately. Instead of following Infrastructure Australia's recommended benchmark of 7%, the Suburban Rail Loop economic appraisals employed a discount rate of 4%. This disparity in discount rates affects how future project expenses are calculated and prompts more investigation into the project's financial components. Furthermore, the Victorian Auditor made the calculation of the benefit-cost ratio (BCR) with the recommended discount rate, and it was between 0.6 and 0.7. This indicates a likely nett social cost, despite a BCR greater than 1 indicating predicted nett societal benefits.

Another issue has also appeared: the worries about the project's location and possible effects on commuting times. They contend that the project's emphasis on remote, low-density locations with significant automobile ownership and travel lengths casts doubt on its viability. The absence of sizable employment centres close to the planned stations raises additional concerns about the project's viability. The business case's partial submission to the state government further erodes trust in the project's sound economic justification.

Cost Overruns
When the Suburban Rail Loop project first became public in August 2018, it was estimated that developing its 90 kilometres would cost $50 billion. However, projections of the costs skyrocketed, going as high as $125 billion.

According to a thorough 400-page business and investment case published in 2021, the project's east and northeast phases are expected to cost $50.5 billion. Notably, the SRL North segment's cost was excluded from this scenario.

In a report conducted in August 2022 by Victoria's Parliamentary Budget Office (PBO), building the project's first and second phases will cost $125 billion by 2084–2025. This estimate is consistent with the $30 billion to $34.5 billion government projection in the 2021 business case. However, details regarding the cost of the SRL West section—which connects Melbourne Airport with Werribee—weren't included in either the PBO research or the government's case.

The state opposition requested a fresh analysis in March 2024, which revealed that the project's first two phases would cost an astounding $216 billion to build and run. This updated estimate, based on the 2022 research, estimated the construction and operating costs for the first two stages at $200 billion.

Funding
The federal government was supposed to pay one-third of the project's total cost. Still, it has clarified that it would only contribute the $2.2 million originally set aside for the tunnelling phase. This leaves a sizable financial gap despite the government's claim that the first stage would be supported by a combination of state and federal contributions coupled with value capture, which would lessen the burden on taxpayers.

The Federal Government released a new infrastructure policy statement that seeks to realign federal spending priorities to support more funding for projects that support housing availability. According to this policy, a project must meet certain requirements to be deemed nationally significant and qualify for federal assistance. These requirements include having a minimum worth of $250 million, connecting to important freight routes, or aligning with larger national goals like housing or essential minerals. Therefore, the federal government would not contribute more money unless the SRL project was judged to align with the policy.

Creative Funding
The project financing plan relies heavily on public-private partnerships and realising enhanced asset values. However, concerns have been raised about the feasibility of these methods covering project costs without increasing the financial burden on taxpayers.

Economists and property tax experts caution that the proposed funding mechanisms outlined in the business case may not generate sufficient revenue to cover government operating expenses. These proposals, scheduled to take effect in 2025, include a stamp duty supplement for commercial property, payments from developers of residential real estate, and a tax for commercial parking.

The project aims to generate $11.5 billion in revenue for the government through value-capture levies on properties benefiting from the project. However, the Victorian Auditor-General's Office doubts this target will be achieved. Analysts suggest that implementing broad-based fees, such as a broad land tax or 'betterment levy,' on all businesses and individuals would more effectively capture the project's benefits.

Marion Terrill of the Grattan Institute expresses concern that the project's limited levies and developer fees might discourage the investment it aims to promote. This underscores the need for a comprehensive funding strategy that fairly and efficiently addresses the project's financial challenges.

Timeline and Delivery
The project is expected to be finished in 2081, assuming the future Premier will fulfils the commitment. Only the eastern part, which runs from Cheltenham to Box Hill, is under construction; completion is scheduled for 2035. The government has stated that succeeding administrations will decide whether to proceed with the next phases.

The Government emphasised that these undertakings are long-term in nature, characterising them as bold and progressive projects intended to meet Victorians' requirements in the present and the future. Andrews, as the Premier that introduce the project, explained that although his government would start the project, it would take longer to complete than it would. This multi-decade timeline emphasises how long-term the project is and how worldwide cooperation is required to see it through to completion.

Seamless Integration
Initial designs for six stations along a 26-kilometre tunnel from Cheltenham to Box Hill are an issue of concern. Stations such as Monash, Cheltenham, and Burwood are particularly significant because they are situated across from major train stations or activity centres. This raises concerns about commuters traversing dangerous roads without designated pedestrian walkways. Whitehorse Mayor Andrew Munroe questions the government's commitment to a "seamless interchange" at Box Hill because it is thought that the project's scope does not include the construction of an underground pedestrian connection.

The proposed Burwood station, which would be located across from Deakin University, is especially worrying since it raises questions about the safety of students crossing the street. The university demands a grade-separated crossing; the council wants an underpass. Likewise, Kingston Mayor Steve Staikos objects to the first designs for Cheltenham station, pointing out that there aren't enough exits and that it would be a long walk to the terminals.

Given the Monash station's location above Normanby Road, experts advise placing it in the centre of the university campus. Monash University supports an entry south of Normanby Road to protect students crossing the busy road in front of the Monash Waste Transfer Station in the industrial region.

Narrative
Melbourne, known for its extensive rail transport system, has encountered substantial obstacles in preserving and extending its network to accommodate the needs of an increasing population and a changing urban landscape. The Metro Tunnel and the Suburban Rail Loop (SRL) are two significant projects.

Metro Tunnel
The Metro Tunnel project aims to alleviate congestion in Melbourne's CBD by constructing a 9km tunnel that will serve as a direct route for trains passing between the east and west of the city. This tunnel has been constructed to address the constraints of the City Loop. Despite being a groundbreaking solution in the 1980s, the City Loop has become overcrowded, resulting in reduced service frequency and delays.

The Metro Tunnel project encompasses the building of five new stations that are equipped with modern safety features, including platform screen doors and a state-of-the-art signalling system. Nevertheless, the initiative has encountered certain challenges. There are concerns regarding the potential electromagnetic interference that may occur with medical equipment in neighbouring facilities such as the Victorian Comprehensive Cancer Centre and the Royal Melbourne Hospital. These problems emphasize the unexpected intricacies of urban infrastructure projects, especially those located in heavily populated city centers.

The project's expenses have also increased, with cost overruns amounting to nearly $1.88 billion beyond the original budget, highlighting the inherent unpredictability of large-scale projects.

Suburban Rail Loop
It was proposed in August 2018 by Prime Minister Daniel Andrews, is a comprehensive initiative aimed at linking Melbourne's suburbs directly, eliminating the need to pass via the CBD. The purpose of this 90km loop is to enhance cross-suburban transportation and will be implemented in stages. The initial phase, known as SRL East, will establish a connection between Cheltenham and Box Hill.

The development phase of the SRL experienced criticism for its private planning process and cost overruns, which resulted in a lack of transparency. Additionally, there was widespread dissatisfaction regarding the economic basis of the project.

The SRL project has been compromised by challenges surrounding its development process. The criticisms mostly centre around the lack of transparency and unconventional approaches employed during its development, which involved avoiding traditional regulatory procedures and extensively relying on consultation with private experts. This approach has resulted in close examination of the project's effectiveness and its compatibility with broader transportation plans in Victoria.

Implemented measures to enhance project disclosure and community participation have been employed to enhance transparency and foster confidence among stakeholders. The planning process was modified to include a greater amount of input from the public and experts.

The cost estimations for the SRL have been remarkably high, with latest estimates indicating a price of over $216 billion for only the first two phases. These concerns have sparked much concern regarding the project's viability economically and the potential burden it could place on future generations.

Stakeholder viewpoints
Government officials perceive these projects as crucial for ensuring the long-term viability of Melbourne's infrastructure.

Community leaders have expressed concerns on the environmental effects and disruptions to the community.

Residents displayed ambivalent sentiments, weighing their fears about potential disruptions against their anticipation of enhanced mobility.

Challenges and Solutions
Metro Tunnel

Challenges: The project encountered technical and environmental obstacles, such as electromagnetic interference with local medical facilities and worries regarding asbestos and contaminated groundwater during construction.

Solutions: The implementation of mitigation measures included the transfer of delicate equipment in hospitals and the implementation of strict environmental monitoring to effectively handle and dispose of dangerous substances in a responsible manner.

The Suburban Rail Loop

Challenges: The development phase of the SRL experienced criticism for its private planning process and cost overruns, which resulted in a lack of transparency. Additionally, there was widespread dissatisfaction regarding the economic basis of the project.

Solution: Implemented measures to enhance project disclosure and community participation have been employed to enhance transparency and foster confidence among stakeholders. The planning process was modified to include a greater amount of input from the public and experts.

Analyzing Impact
Economic: Thousands of jobs created, local economies boosted by better accessibility and fresh business prospects.

Social: Better quality of living with shorter commute times and more connectedness.

Environmental: Issues include how building debris is managed and how long-term such massive infrastructure projects can last.

Project Milestones and Events
Metro Tunnel:

In 2016, there was an announcement made and development began.

The expected completion date for the project is 2024, with continual modifications being made to handle electromagnetic issues and other unforeseen obstacles.

The Suburban Rail Loop:

2018: Announcement of the project.

2022: The year in which groundbreaking and the start of initial construction activities take place.

In 2035, the SRL East will be opened in a planned and specific manner, with other phases to be implemented later as part of Victoria's Big Build project, specifically in 2024b.

Discussion Questions

 * To what extent has the stakeholder involvement process proven to be successful for these projects? What other measures may have been implemented to enhance transparency and foster public confidence?
 * How flexible and scalable are the Suburban Rail Loop and Metro Tunnel projects? What impact is anticipated on Melbourne's urban regeneration and development from the Metro Tunnel and Suburban Rail Loop?
 * What were the primary factors contributing to the cost overruns encountered during the Metro Tunnel project, and what were the repercussions on the project's schedule and public image? Analyze the financial management tactics implemented in order to prevent additional escalations.
 * What modifications to policy are required to facilitate the effective execution and functioning of these initiatives? Should these policies consider matters such as financial support, management, and continuous upkeep?