Talk:Strategy for Information Markets/Background/Nash equilibrium

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Documentation here TDang (discuss • contribs) 19:27, 7 October 2011 (UTC)

Review 2/7/2011
This is a well written piece, and is written in a way that is easy to understand. I think one thing that I would like to see as a reader is information about actually conducted tests of these experiments or ones similar to them. How well do these predict peoples behavior given the situation? Jvanhenk (discuss • contribs) 05:27, 8 February 2012 (UTC)

TDang review April 2012
I'm reviewing this version. I'll likely be more critical than complimentary, because (a) that's the way I am and (b) that's what will help improve things. Please don't take the criticism-over-compliments to mean I have a wholly negative view.

Make sure to check the all-purpose review thoughts as well.

TDang (discuss • contribs) 21:58, 29 April 2012 (UTC)
 * I moved this page from Nash equilibrium and coordination games to just Nash equilibrium (to include other selected games). That's because I think including public goods games on this page would also be worthwhile. Those are structurally the same as [[w:prisoner's dilemma|], but are more specifically interpreted.
 * So, doing something with a public goods / voluntary contribution game would help here.
 * Once those are included, some restructuring of the introduction would also be in order.
 * "In all games matrices there are two pure strategy and two mixed strategy results."--This paragraph is incorrect, in a number of ways.
 * First, it's wrong about what mixed strategy means. I don't anticipate using mixed strategy in this book, and it's not very important for the games that this page will discuss, so leaving out mixed strategy altogether is probably a good approach.
 * Second, it's important to separate the definition of the game as represented in the table from the solution/prediction which Nash equilibrium will find. The game exists separate from the Nash equilibrium.
 * Nash equilibrium--This section needs to be phrased very carefully. It's a bit confusing now. I don't think we want to give the formal mathematical definition, but what we give should be equally rigorous.
 * That's about the right amount of experiments on coordination games. Unless there's something which clearly connects the experiments to the kind of things we're interested in (information goods, network externalities) we don't want to fill up too much on experiments.
 * References
 * A google search is not a good reference, in fact it breaks Wikibooks' spam filter. Here;s an alternative link: http://www.uh.edu/econpapers/RePEc/hou/wpaper/2006-01.pdf
 * Try to use the references with all appropriate information, with the author and title being more important than the university they're from.
 * It looks like both of your references were to "working papers". If possible, it's better to use a paper which has been published. (It's possible those papers have been published, and you can reference the published versions.)
 * I was working from the principle that this page shouldn't get much bigger. It still shouldn't get much bigger, but expansing to include a public goods game, and maybe a public goods game with a provision point would be worthwhile.