Talk:Principles of Economics/Utility

Tautological fallacy of revealed preferences
The inability to measure the made-up concept of 'utils' independently of 'revealed-preferences' should be covered in this article. See, inter alia, Sen’s critiques starting with “Behaviour and the concept of preference” (Sen 1973), “Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioural Foundations of Economic Theory” (Sen 1977), “Internal Consistency of Choice” (Sen 1993), “Maximization and the Act of Choice” (Sen 1997), his book 'Rationality and Freedom' (Sen 2002), etc. There are many other authors and peer-reviewed articles in this vein. There are of course rejoinders, and rebuttals to those rejoinders -- it is an ongoing debate that deserves discussion in this article. Benefac3 (discuss • contribs) 19:43, 21 December 2017 (UTC)