Talk:Consciousness Studies/The Philosophical Problem/Machine Consciousness

I found the discussion of the the simulation argument and Nick Bostrom's ideas inadequate and somewhat misleading. Even though it is true that Bostrom says that conscious states could arise in random associations of dust particles or interstellar gas, his main thrust is that given an infinite universe (or even nearly infinite) any thing that could happen however improbable will happen given enough time. His case for human beings being part of a simulation is based on a different proposition, e.g. that given the probability of future generations of humans having the ability to create a simulated universe or 'ancestor simulations' containing conscious entities, the probability of any human existing as part of an ancestor simulation was greater than not.

I find Bostrom very much a physicalist (or perhaps a functionalist) in that I don't think he ever considers the possibility of conscious states divorced from some physical substrate, merely that there be 'some' substrate and to that it operates in a way to be functionally equivalent to the human mind.


 * The discussion could certainly be extended, not least with references to earlier versions of the argument by other authors. Bostrom simply states that conscious experience will supervene on the form of his device without providing futher justification (see quote in article). It is this that makes it seem as if he believes in the non-physical. His argument might actually have fallen apart if he could state the physical basis for consciousness because, unless consciousness were a property of Turing machines, his "simulation" would simply be a part of the world containing a conscious entity and anybody can create such a "simulation" by allowing procreation. RobinH 19:09, 22 November 2005 (UTC)