Talk:Consciousness Studies/Introduction

The summary section has been commented out for the time being. This is such a broad subject that the existing summary may be doint it a disservice. RobinH 13:53, 22 April 2007 (UTC)

Unwaranted assumptions
Defining Consciousness

The contributors should be applauded for recognizing that “Everyone has their own view of the nature of consciousness based on their education and background.”. However, concerning the definition of consciousness there are people who do not subscribe to the phenomenological/access difference (eg. Dennett, 1997).

Further unwaranted assumptions are made in the introduction. I quote:


 * Phenomenal consciousness is much like the “perceptual space” of psychological and physiological research. It is the many simultaneous events that become the space of experience in general and it is now a legitimate target of scientific research.

What is here (above) taken to be a perceptual space I assume to be equivalent to “phenomenal space” (eg. Dainton, 2007). However, Dainton's concept of phenomenological space builds on neutral monism and his method critical phenomenology, a method that I believe Husserlian phenomenologists would consider akward to use. Some representationalists are likely to have difficulties with accepting this concept as well because of the neutral monism.

It is true that attempts have been made in defining consciousness. But there exists no consensus on any definition. Rather, what many scholars of consciousness would agree upon are some of the characteristics and concepts of consciousness (Farthing, 1992).

The purpose of consciousness studies The purpose of consciousness studies could be stated more explicit, at least in less vague terms. After all, “virtual reality” is a metaphor that is not easily grasped on a first reading. David Chalmers has written a paper that I recommend for paraphrasing: http://consc.net/papers/scicon.html Of course, it is only one take on the project for consciousness studies and people disagree about whether Neural Correlates of Consciousness (aka NCC) should be studied at all.

References
 * Dainton, Barry (2007). Coming together: the unity of conscious experience. In: Velmans, Max, Schneider, Susan (eds.) (2007). The Blackwell companion to consciousness. Malden, MA: Blackwell.


 * Dennett, Daniel C. (1997). The path not taken. In: Block, Ned, Flanagan, Owen, & Güzeldere, Güven (1997). The Nature of Consciousness: philosophical debates. Cambridge, MA: MIT.


 * Farthing, William G. (1992). The Psychology of Consciousness. NJ: Prentice Hall. Phenomena


 * Yes, the book is unashamedly about phenomenal consciousness and deals with Dennett's dissent as a side issue. The book was conceived as a supplementary text for physiologists so the problem here is how to link the philosophy of consciousness into the neurophysiology of consciousness. The most important connection between philosophy and neurophysiology is that both attempt to explain how our singular visual field, the "view", is derived from two eyes which have lenses rather than pin-holes and different images in each. This is a physical problem that requires a physical theory although the philosophical contributions to the problem are fascinating. The "perceptual space" referred to is the "“perceptual space” of psychological and physiological research" rather than Dainton's version. RobinH 08:54, 5 June 2007 (UTC)


 * Phenomenal consciousness exists indeed, but even those who believe in phenomenal consciousness may not accept access consciousness and it is hence an issue of waranting the dichotomy (P- and A-consciousness), rather than whether the category (phenomenological consciousness) exists or not. I am sorry for not being clearer on this. I cannot deny that there is subjective experience.
 * I strongly disagree with the idea that the most important connection between philosophy and neurophysiology of consciousness lies in explaining the visual field. Blind people are also conscious - there is something it it is like to be blind. To fully explain stereoscopic vision thru retinotopic mapping and thru the visual pathways in the brain is understandably an exciting topic for a physiologist, but it is not central to the field of consciousness studies, which seeks to understand consciousness thru all possible experiences without restrictions to sensory input. However, I admit that of all the senses, vision has been studied most extensively in neurophysiology and is therefore a good candidate in the search of correlates between consciousness and brain physiology. (Perhaps we're on the same page here.) Phenomena 09:26, 9 June 2007 (UTC)


 * You might be interested in this: http://www.seeingwithsound.com/users.htm I really need to update the neuro section with the fMRI studies of these devices. RobinH 15:52, 9 June 2007 (UTC)


 * Thanks, I have read about similar devices that translate between the senses. Perhaps you will find this video interesting: from CBS News Phenomena 09:23, 11 June 2007 (UTC)