Infrastructure Past, Present, and Future Casebook/Gotthard Base Tunnel

This casebook is a case study on the Gotthard Base Tunnel by Handan Karaman, Maram Ayasou, Abdulrahman Leila, and Zainab Syed as part of the Infrastructure Past, Present and Future: GOVT 490-004 (Synthesis Seminar for Policy & Government) / CEIE 499-001 (Special Topics in Civil Engineering) Spring 2022 course at George Mason University's Schar School of Policy and Government and the Volgenau School of Engineering Sid and Reva Dewberry Department of Civil, Environmental, and Infrastructure Engineering.

DISCLAIMER: The information presented in this wikibook is for academic purposes only and has no goal beyond presenting what has been learned. Any views presented in this wikibook are the views of their respective writers and do not necessarily reflect the views of our professor, Dr. Gifford, or that of our institution, George Mason University.

Summary of the Gotthard Base Tunnel
Gotthard base tunnel (GBT) is the longest and deepest underground railway tunnel in the world. At 57 kilometers long, it runs through the Alps in Switzerland and is connected to the Gotthard railway system which is part of an international railway system connecting northern Europe [2].

The GBT was officially open to public use in 2016, and its main purpose is to shorten the time it takes from southern to northern Switzerland [2].Originally, there was a winding mountain road going over the Alps and the Gotthard tunnel (1882), but due to the road and tunnel reaching their capacity over time, the need for GBT was introduced. The GBT railway can travel up to 250 kilometers per hour, reducing passenger travel time by 1 hour, and can transport up to 3,600 tonnes of cargo, crossing through 16% of the European Union's GDP economic area [18].

Actors

 * AlpTransit Gotthard AG was responsible for construction, a wholly owned subsidiary of the Swiss Federal Railways (SSB CFF FFS) [12]


 * The Gotthard tunnel project was funded by Swiss Taxpayers and fees on trucks. [13]


 * Design Engineer was Louis Favre [14]


 * Alfred Escher was the rail tycoon leading the first mountain route [7]


 * Architect was Mario Botta [12]

Timeline of Events
Gotthard Base Tunnel, Switzerland - Railway Technology


 * Construction(drilling) for the base tunnel begins (1999) [7]


 * Geology and surveying done (26 November 2000) [7]


 * The new railway system that was installed is tested (2005) [7]


 * Base tunnel breakthrough: After 4 years of construction the tunnel boring reaches 13.5 km (2006) [7]


 * 115 km of rail tracks were placed (30 October, 2014) [7]


 * Railways safety tests were conducted (30 September 2015) [7]


 * Gotthard Base Tunnel opens to the public. (1 June 2016) [7]


 * Referendum for a second Gotthard tunnel due to demand. Approved by 57% to 43%. (2016) [4]

Benefits
Four Herrenknecht Gripper TBMs conquered the mountain using mechanized tunneling technology, shattering speed and length records in the process. The Gotthard Base Tunnel, which is 57 kilometers long, connects Erstfeld with Bodio today. The world's longest railway tunnel opened its doors on June 1, 2016. It connects Switzerland and Europe by forming the center of the New Alpine Transversal (NEAT). [11]

The main breakthrough at the Gotthard Base Tunnel, which occurred on March 23, 2011 in the Western tunnel and on October 15, 2010 in the Eastern tunnel, was the most critical step toward completing the world's longest railway tunnel. Switzerland is connecting northern and southern Europe by train via the Alps with the two-times 57-kilometer long epoch-making project. More than 85 kilometers of the major tubes have been excavated and secured using Herrenknecht Gripper tunnel boring machines. [11]

The first high-speed trains will pass through the Gotthard Base Tunnel at speeds of 200 to 250 kilometers per hour by the end of 2016. The journey time from Zurich to Milan will be reduced by one hour to 2 hours and 40 minutes once the NEAT is fully operational. Swiss Railways expects to reduce freight transit times in particular, marking yet another significant improvement in traffic logistics between Germany and Italy. Trans-Alpine rail travel is entering a new era. Setting out from Zurich's Bahnhofstrasse for a morning of leisurely shopping in Milan's beautiful Galleria Vittorio Emanuele II, and returning the same afternoon with shopping bags brimming with the best Italian designer apparel. This isn't a dream. This dream is coming to fruitionott. [11]

A one-of-a-kind, historic project - the contraction of the new Gotthard Base Tunnel, as well as the Ceneri and Zimmerberg Base Tunnels - will make this rapid trip between the two commercial areas possible. Two single-lane tunnel tubes will cross the Alpine range from valley floor to valley floor, as it were on an almost level track, with a length of 57 kilometers and a maximum altitude of 55 meters above sea level, i.e. truly at the door of the St.Gotthard mountain. This will put an end to fright train travel that was so sluggish that passengers could virtually pick the flowers along the way, and it would eliminate the need for double locomotives to move freight trains up severe gradients. [11]

Risks
The visionaries of the GBT were well aware of the massive undertaking they were suggesting. Never before had a railway been dug through such depths of a mountain, and definitely not to the extensive length the railway covers. However, perhaps they didn’t anticipate the variety of risks and consequential setbacks the project would face and which led to the construction of the project being completed almost 50 years after its conception.

Safety: The biggest factor of concern for engineers working on the GBT was safety. Throughout the planning of the railway’s design, special attention was given to the safety of the construction workers, as well as of the future passengers of the railway. With the railway design itself, given that one section of the tunnel would have 2,300 feet of mountain on top of it, structural and geotechnical engineers worked together to ensure safety was not compromised [18]. From a structural engineering standpoint, the accessibility limitations of analyzing how much weight would be contributed from the mountain itself, the living and dead loads on the railway, and the speed the train would travel at were initially difficult to determine. For geotechnical engineers, the type of matter the mountain is made up and determining the tunnel’s material, factoring for erosion and settling, and other necessary components were considered. One technique to mitigate the overall safety risks to construction workers was construction of the tunnel system in smaller phases, with the completion of each phase providing guidelines for refinements to design plans of the following sections [6]. The use of boring machines also eliminated much of the risk for construction workers and engineers as they had to spend less time underneath the tunnel during construction [1].

Cost: The initial budget proposed for the GBT section of the project was $10 billion in 1992 [15]. However, as further advancements in safety features and technology emerged, it was quickly realized that an increase to the budget would be needed to ensure the project remained efficient and sustainable. This led to the need for a vote to approve a new total budget of $15.5 billion in 1998, with official construction of the tunnel beginning in 1999 [17]. Initial opponents of the project tried swaying the election in their favor and discourage public approval of further spending on the GBT, but the budget was approved, and construction and planning for the GBT resumed. Cost continued to be a recurring issue for the tunnel throughout the completion of its construction, as additional issues on who, how, and what would be paid for, considering the extensive network the NRLA would pass through. Eventually, the final cost of the GBT upon its completion in 2016 was an estimated $24 billion, well over the original budget [17]. Though cost was an immense factor in the implementation of the project, given its massive scale, the projected economic, social, and sustainability benefits well justify the costs incurred.

The successful completion of the GBT shows that even with such monumental risks, such engineering feats are possible, and now paves the way for similar projects in other regions to expand their intercontinental and regional railways.

Maintenance
Despite the fact that the Gotthard Base Tunnel is designed to endure over a century, the world's largest and most complicated tunnel system requires routine maintenance. Currently, maintenance is scheduled for Saturday and Sunday evenings (closed for eight hours) and Monday nights (closed for six hours).

Cleaning of drainage systems (the tunnel contains 500 kilometers of drainpipes), electro-mechanical installations, tunnel ventilation, cross-passage doors, and railway infrastructure track, contact lines, and safety systems, among other things, are all part of routine maintenance.[8]

308 kilometers of tracks, 153 kilometers of catenary, 7,200 lights, 500 kilometers of drainpipes, and 2,200 electrical cabinets are made up of two 57-kilometer single-track tunnels and 13 kilometers of newly built overground lines. These are only a handful of the figures that show how large and sophisticated the GBT and its facilities are. Maintaining the world's longest railway tunnel is a huge undertaking. There are just two entrances to the 57-kilometer-long subterranean tubes.

Each time maintenance work is performed, a tunnel tube is closed for three nights. Up to eleven workplaces are relocated from the new maintenance and intervention centres (MIC) in Biasca and Erstfeld to the GBT during this time, where they are built up, put into service, then vacated and transferred back. SBB requires tunnel maintenance vehicles, which are made up of several partial trains that split into smaller units after entering the tunnel and are assigned to various workstations.

The first six vehicles are part of a batch of thirteen base maintenance trucks. Each machine can be powered by overhead electricity or a combination of diesel and electricity.

Each 80-tonne vehicle comes with a crane and an air-conditioned people module with a kitchen and a combustion toilet. The base vehicles can be controlled remotely or from the driver's cab. They can be managed from other wagons as well.

Harsco also offers flat wagons that can be joined with an automatic coupler to build maintenance trains that are 300-440 meters long. The wagons include lifting platforms and a "unique moveable sealing gate" that can seal the tunnel to reduce wind turbulence during maintenance work, according to Harsco. The trucks will be stationed in Erstfeld and Biasco, respectively, at new tunnel maintenance centers.

Funding and Financing
A new finance model was developed as a result of the extensive discussion, and it was the subject of a popular vote on November 29th, 1998. The Swiss people approved the FinöV Fund for the funding of public transportation infrastructure (with a budget of 30 billion Swiss Francs) with a 63.5 percent "Yes" vote. 3.8 billion Swiss Francs (45 percent of the FinöV, price level 1998) were set aside to cover the NRLA's construction "à fond perdu" (lost money). Only 25% of the investment had to be financed on the private capital market due to the FinöV contribution, which represented well over 75% of the total necessary credit.

As in previous finance models, the future operator, the Swiss Federal Railways, would be responsible for repaying this portion of the investment. In 2005, however, the repayment of this portion was agreed to be waived. [9] Only 25% of the investment had to be financed on the private capital market because the FinöV contribution represented around 75% of the total necessary credit. As in previous financing models, this portion of the investment would be repaid by the future operator—the SBB-CFF-FFS. The project finance strategy enabled a clear and secure financing of the entire project from the start, regardless of the existing state budget or any political changes, preventing potential construction delays or stoppage owing to a lack of financial resources or political consensus. The Gotthard project's success hinged on the availability of reliable finance. As the constructor, ATG was responsible for two control circuits:

(1) Project and cost management in relation to the project sponsor, the federal government;

(2) Project and cost management in relation to their vendors.

The contract between the Swiss Federal Government and ATG controlled the order placed by the Swiss Federal Government. The cost-management process was set up in general with the goal of achieving the NRLA Controlling Instructions (NCI), which outlined the critical control figures as well as the kind and frequency of reporting (every six months) and how to handle variances.

To guarantee that all project modifications could be handled and recorded in a clear and intelligible manner, a management system for engineering changes had to be updated on a regular basis. The approvals duties were clearly defined so that the essential choices could be taken at the correct time for the proper stage. Variations in performance that impacted costs and timeframes could usually only be applied after the objectives had been adjusted. The Swiss Federal Office of Transportation (FOT) was alerted in an incident report if a performance variation had to be imposed promptly for scheduling considerations.

ATG might seek for a change to the project terms when the Swiss FOT approves a change request. The major issues that led to updates of the cost reference basis were: project upgrading to incorporate new safety measures and state-of-the-art technologies (due to the project's two-decade duration); extra costs related to geology (situations with worse geological and geotechnical conditions than expected were the most impactful here, while other situations had more favorable geological and geotechnical conditions than expected); and cost overruns (due to the project's two-decade duration).

ATG tracked the progress of the likely final costs and any financial hazards on a quarterly basis and reported to the control authority every six months. The rise in credit for the Gotthard Base Tunnel alone—from 6.3 billion CHF to 9.9 billion CHF (half of the above-mentioned 13.8 billion CHF), or 53 percent without inflation—was not predicted, but it was still noteworthy. Variations stemming from orders made by the Swiss FOT, which continually tried to create a tunnel with state-of-the-art safety features and technology, accounted for about half of the additional expenses. Ground dangers, which could not be directly influenced, accounted for just 9% of the entire increase, or a sixth of the whole rise.

Policy
Referendums


 * 1) NRLA Proposal for a budget of 3.8 billion Swiss Francs(53.4% voted “YES”)
 * 2) Alps initiative to protect the Alpine environment (51.9% voted“YES”)
 * 3) Public Transport Funding of 30 billion Swiss Francs (63.5% voted “YES”)
 * 4) Bilateral EU Agreements / 40-tonne Trucks / Heavy Traffic Fee (67.2% voted ‘YES”)
 * 5) Referendum for a second Gotthard tunnel due to demand (57% voted “YES”)

Although Switzerland is often coined as a neutral player in the political arena, the country still took great strides in persuading its own public and neighboring nations of the economic, social, and environmental benefits the Gotthard Base Tunnel would bring to the European continent. The Gotthard Committee was originally set up in 1853, named after the Gotthard mountain range and the shared interest in its development. The committee, which is still active today, was instrumental in persuading stakeholders,, such as cities, transportation associations, companies, and cantons, to promote the first mountain route and eventually the New Railway Link through the Alps (NRLA) seen today. [15]

Regional Politics

At the forefront of the Swiss political strategy is its federalism, or its approach to finding compromises to keep all participants in the Gotthard project satisfied. [15] Switzerland is comprised of 26 cantons, or federal states, each of which has its own cultures and political interests, and has full autonomy over its region's education, healthcare, law enforcement, taxes, and social welfare systems. This separation of power from the Swiss Federal Constitution, and Swiss direct democracy in national elections on public policies, often made it almost impossible for policies to be passed due to strong lobbying committees and public influence driving elections. As such, only 13 of the 26 cantons are part of the Gotthard Committee; However, the tunnel still being approved by the public came from its connection to another long Alpine tunnel, the Lotschberg, which was key to speeding up rail traffic from the western end of the country, along with improving connections in the northeast. The approval also came in part by the nationalization of the country’s 5 biggest railway companies, the last of which was the Gotthard Railway Company in 1909. [16] This shows the power of political lobbying in Swiss federalism and transport policy. [17] Ultimately, in 1998, a majority of the cantons approved the Federal Decree on the Construction and Financing of Public Transport Infrastructure Projects, propelling the massive railway project forward for the next 20 years. [15]

Aside from inter-regional politics, Switzerland also had to deal with neighboring countries of Austria, France, Germany, and Italy. As anticipated by the construction of the railway, increase in transportation of people, as well as goods, sparked the attention of Germany, Austria, and Italy specifically, leading to the 1989 congress for European solutions for rail transport across the Alps. [15] The takeaways of this congress, including the emphasis on environmental policy and high potential for economic development across Europe, led to the 1992 meeting of Switzerland and the European Economic Community (EEC), putting Switzerland as a vital point in European transport policy. The approval of the NRLA by the EEC was before even the Swiss public could approve of it, but again showing the social and economic benefits it would bring, aided in its 64% public approval later that year. [16]

Environmental Policies

Railway is a popular mode of transportation primarily for its relatively environmental friendly usage. As environmental issues became bigger concerns for voters, specifically in the 1970s, finding alternative mass transit options aside from cars and road travel became appealing. This came as perfect timing for the Gotthard Tunnel, as the 1971 passage of a new environmental protection article in the Swiss Constitution with 93% voter approval paved the way for the tunnel’s eventual landslide approval in the 1990s. [15] This article focused on the protection of human beings and the natural environment, with realization of the negative impacts of mass motorization and road traffic on ecological health. Gotthard’s later approval stems back to this early campaign among voters for sustainable transportation preservation of the Alpine environment. Later in 1992, a $10 billion construction project, the Gotthard Base Tunnel, was approved by Swiss voters. [17] Then again in 1994, 52% of voters back the Alps Initiative, which called for the Federal Constitution to protect the Alpine region from the negative impact of traffic and stop further road expansions, along with shifting traffic from road to rail. This led to a expedited development of the NRLA and the transport agreement with the EEC in 1999. [16]

Transportation Policies

Public mass transportation, such as high-speed railway, are often overlooked by governments as emphasis shifts towards modernization and optimization of road networks. This was the case for the Gotthard tunnel, as its ridership in 1980 dropped to 10% of passengers, with the remaining travel through the Alps by road instead. Gotthard’s history of being a popular mode of travel for passenger traffic and disproportionate attention to roads instead rose concerns among the Swiss Federal Railway SBB, prompting reevaluation of the federal government’s transport strategy and creating a state rail company. However, it was not all smooth sailing for the NRLA, for in 1992, Swiss voters rejected joining the European Economic Area, with implications on how goods traffic would be shifted from road to rail. The EEC demanded a renegotiation of the transport policy decisions, with a final bilateral agreement being made in 2000. [15]

Discussion Questions

 * 1) Do you believe that this project was successful/efficient?
 * 2) Do you believe a second tunnel should be added right next to the GBT?