Canadian Criminal Law/Intent and Knowledge

Intent
"Intent" refers to the mental state of the individual consisting of the desire or purpose to achieve a particular consequence, or where the consequences the person sees as certain, "substantially", or "practically" certain.

Intent is often proven by way of inference.

Inferences are factual findings based on common sense.

There is the long-standing inference that a person intends the natural consequences of one’s actions applies to many situations.

The inference will be made in most any circumstances except where there may be evidence to the contrary. Doubt may be raised as to the specific intent of the person where they suffer from mental illness or were intoxicated.

Generally speaking, the inference requires the assumption that the accused has the capacity to form intent.

The presence of the word "wilfully" in an provision for an criminal code offence "generally signals a subjective mens rea requirement, but the appropriate meaning of the term ‘wilfully’ will depend on the context in which it is found." In context of a probation order, "wilful" denotes "a legislative concern for a relatively high level of mens rea" that requires a intent to breach and have a purpose in doing so.

Wilful Blindness
Wilful blindness refers to the accused's state of mind. The doctrine attributes "knowledge to a party whose strong suspicions have been aroused but who refrains from making inquiries to have those suspicions confirmed. The doctrine serves to override attempts to self-immunize against criminal liability by deliberately refusing to acquire actual knowledge."

It is not enough that there be a suspicion in the mind of the accused. Rather, the accused must have "virtually knew the critical fact, and intentionally declined to secure that knowledge."

The determination inquires into whether "the accused shut his ... eyes because he .. knew or strongly suspected that looking would fix him ... with knowledge?”

The doctrine is not premised on "what a reasonable person would have done, but requires a finding that the accused, with actual suspicion, deliberately refrained from making inquiries because he or she did not want his or her suspicions confirmed." To put it another way, it is not a form of "constructive knowledge" by way of a standard of reasonableness..

Where wilful blindness is established, "the knowledge imputed is the equivalent of actual, subjective knowledge."

In certain circumstances, "where an accused made some or basic inquiries, but still harboured suspicions, it remains open to the trier of fact to find wilful blindness".